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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS PRICE DISCRIMINATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACT
WENDY J. GORDON*
INTRODUCTION
Under federal copyright law, Congress places some works of
authorship in the public domain, and leaves some behaviors by the
public unregulated. The same is true of patent law. Historically,
courts have generally respected the resulting liberties.
Imagine that a publisher of Shakespeare's sonnets puts a label on
each volume saying, "By Taking Possession of This Volume The
Purchaser Promises Not to Resell, Loan or Rent it, and Further
Promises Not to Copy Or Publicly Recite The Poems Printed Herein."
We expect that a state court would refuse to enforce the purported
restriction.1 Similarly, the manufacturer of an unpatented device
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1. Mid-century, when the Metropolitan Opera broadcast its performances of classic
compositions, the risk of nonconsensual copying or rebroadcast was significant. Record
companies that were licensed to make recordings or that themselves had hired performers
lacked the limited rights now found in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(7), 106(1)-(3), 106(6), 114, 1101
(1997). Performers and companies tried to use "do not copy" labels to give themselves rights
that Congress had not awarded. Learned Hand famously rebuffed one such attempt in RCA
Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940):
Of the nine records here in question five ... bore the legend: 'Not Licensed for Radio
Broadcast.' ... After August 15, 1937, this notice was changed to read as follows:
'Licensed by Mfr. under U.S. Pats. 1625705, 1637544, RE. 16588 (& other Pats.
Pending) Only For Non-Commercial Use on Phonographs in Homes. Mfr. & Original
Purchaser Have Agreed This Record Shall Not Be Resold Or Used For Any Other
Purpose. See Detailed Notice on Envelope.' These later records were inclosed in
envelopes which even more clearly gave notice of the same limitations....
... [E]ven if [the conductor's] 'common-law property' in his performances
survived the sale of the records on which they were inscribed, it would be very difficult
to see how he, or a fortiori the maker of the records, could impose valid restrictions
upon their resale.... We do not, however, have that question to decide, for we think
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cannot expect to gain any legal rights by painting "Do Not Copy" on
each product as it rolls toward the end of the assembly line. Yet
today courts are beginning to honor just such restraints in the context
of contracts over computer software.2
To justify enforcing these restrictive legends, the supposed
virtues of "price discrimination" are sometimes offered. Indeed,
Harold Demsetz has shown that in some circumstances price discrimi-
nation might make possible what is usually thought impossible:
simultaneously providing incentives to authors and inventors, and
access to everyone who values the product above its marginal cost.3
But at no point does Professor Demsetz or anyone else suggest that a
monopoly coupled with price discrimination will always produce
results superior to those achieved in a competitive market.
Price discrimination increases a producer's revenues, and thus
that the 'common-law property' in these performances ended with the sale of the
records and that the restriction did not save it; and that if it did, the records themselves
could not be clogged with a servitude.
Id. at 87-88 (emphasis added).
I do not mean to overstate the state courts' unanimity. Some attempts to enforce restraints
on chattels have been successful. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41
HARV. L. REv. 945, 957-69 (1928); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round:
Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1250, 1262 (1956) (arguing, largely without
reference to copyright, that "enforcement [of equitable servitudes on chattels] ought to depend
on public policy"). In addition, much of what the plaintiff attempted in Whiteman was later
achieved under the misappropriation doctrine. See Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), afft'd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1951).
For an exploration of the equitable servitude doctrine in the computer context, see
Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the Feudal Nature of
Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 577 (1994).
2. It might be argued, however, that a true servitude would "run with" the object, no
matter how the object finds its way into someone's hands, while today's shrinkwrap and click-
through licenses generally purport only to restrict the purchaser and those with whom he trades.
See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996). In current commentary, a
live question is when (and whether) there can be such frequent coupling of copies with
restraints that the practice should be treated as property. It is probably uncontroverted that
equitable servitudes are property. See Chafee, Equitable Servitudes, supra note 1, at 957-69.
3. See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293
(1970). Copyright and patent give a degree of market power, sometimes a monopoly. All
acknowledge that the monopolies that the law produces to provide incentives involve a
deadweight allocative loss. Professor Demsetz argues this loss could in theory be eliminated by
perfect price discrimination. Under perfect price discrimination, every customer would pay an
amount exactly equal to the maximum he or she would be willing to pay. Consumer surplus
would be zero-but everyone who valued an embodiment at a level at or equal to its marginal
cost would be able to possess one. The person who values a copy at marginal cost pays that
amount, and everyone who values copies at higher amounts will pay more. No one would be
excluded from access to the good. And because all the consumer surplus is transferred to the
owner of the copyright or patent, incentives are at least as strong (actually, stronger) than they
would be under conditions of a one-price monopoly.
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potentially increases incentives. 4  But it can also raise price and
reduce quantities, without yielding any incentive payoff large enough
to compensate. Yet the tool of price discrimination has recently been
employed as if it were self-justifying.
The error can be most easily seen if we recognize that all
intellectual property law operates by fostering price discrimination.
For example, when a copyright proprietor puts copies of her book,
song, software, or movie on the market, copyright helps her to
distinguish between copiers and non-copiers. It also helps her to
charge differing prices among those purchasers who are public
performers, adapters, public displayers, and so on,5 and to further
subdivide the rights6 and pricing structures7 within those groups.
Parts 18 and II9 of this essay explain the dynamics and the
definitional issues involved. Part 11110 examines the well-known
ProCD opinion by Judge Frank Easterbrook,1' and critiques his
handling of both the economic issues and the issue of pre-emption.
Part IV criticizes the handling of price discrimination notions found in
an essay within the current symposium. 12 In that part I suggest that
even where some price discrimination is necessary for incentives,
more price discrimination is not necessarily better. 3
4. The increase in incentives is "potential" rather than inevitable, because at some point
incentives will be adequate to call forth the desired work, and any further increase in revenues
will be pure rent.
5. The rights of authors (and their employers and assignees) are set out in various parts of
title 17 of the United States Code. The major components appear in 17 U.S.C. § 106, set out
infra in text accompanying note 24. Interestingly, the copyright statute is explicit about
encouraging many more forms of price discrimination than appear in the patent statute.
Compare infra note 23 (Patent statute) with infra text accompanying note 24 (Copyright
statute).
6. The extent to which intellectual property rights should be divisible has been a matter of
debate. The 1976 Copyright Act
contained[ed] the first explicit statutory recognition of the principle of divisibility of
copyright in our law. This provision [now enacted in § 201(d)], which ha[d] long been
sought by authors and their representatives, ... means that any of the exclusive rights
that go to make up a copyright ... can be transferred and owned separately.
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at
123 (1976).
7. This can occur through a collective rights society such as ASCAP as well as through an
individual employing the statute, as Jane Ginsburg has reminded me. Thus ASCAP can charge
nightclubs a lower fee for playing its members' songs than it charges radio broadcasters.
8. See infra pp. 1370-75.
9. See infra pp. 1375-78.
10. See infra pp. 1378-86.
11. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
12. Part IV appears infra pp. 1386-89. The essay it examines is William W. Fisher III,
Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
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I. CLASSIC STORY RETOLD IN THE LANGUAGE OF PRICE
DISCRIMINATION
Intellectual property's traditional Genesis tale is essentially one
of enabling a creator to price discriminate. A creator, whether
inventor or author, wants to sell embodiments of her product.14 Some
potential customers want to purchase her machine, story or database
for their businesses; some want a copy for personal use such as
recreation or looking up the phone numbers of old friends; and some
want a copy for the purpose of reproducing it.
Without an ability to distinguish at least two groups of
customers- dividing the (1) end-users or consumers from the (2)
publishers and other replicators-the creator will probably have to
sell her embodiments at one price. Of the options this would leave
open to the creator, none are happy, unless she is lucky enough to
have a customer who values using the product at a price equal to its
creation costs. In the absence of that rare circumstance, the creator
has a few uncomfortable choices. She might aim at the consumer
market, and ask a fairly low price for each embodiment. At this price
(let's call it "P"), some consumers will be willing to buy the machines
or books the creator sells. But replicators will buy as well. The
creator may find her market drying up as consumers turn to buying
the copies that replicators offer for sale at lower price. This lower
price, which we might call "P-marginal," will tend to equal the
marginal cost of making a new physical embodiment.
The replicator is able to charge P-marginal and still stay in
business because he does not bear the expenses of creation such as
research and development.15 If copyists are able to sell identical
embodiments (and this is a big "if"-the caveats are well canvassed in
the copyright literature6) and charge only P-marginal for each, the
14. A typical embodiment for inventors might be a machine or a chemical compound, and
for authors a typical embodiment would be a book, cassette, or CD-ROM. Under copyright
law, by definition, all embodiments can be classified as either "copies" or "phonorecords." See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1997) (definitions of "copies, "phonorecords," and "fixed").
15. In addition, a copyist bears less risk than the creator did. A creator will not know in
advance if her product is likely to be successful in the market. She therefore will create only if
the revenue stream likely to result from success is large enough to cover her costs multiplied by
a factor reflecting the odds of failure. A replicator can act after the creator's product has
proven its market appeal. Because the replicator can be free of both creation costs and risk, the
replicator will be willing to enter the market even if the projected revenue stream is smaller
than the amount needed to motivate the creator. Note, however, to the extent that a replicator
seeks to minimize risk through delayed entry, the creator's "lead time advantage" will be
greater, and her need for IPRs less.
16. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970);
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creator's embodiments priced above P-marginal, at P, are likely to go
largely unsold. Creation costs will not be covered.
Alternatively, the creator can lower her own price to P-marginal,
and sell more embodiments. However, she will again be unable to
cover her creation costs since (by definition) P-marginal does not
include such costs. This option, like the option of charging P, will not
encourage creativity.
As another choice, the creator could aim at the "replicator"
market, and demand a price for access to her manuscript or invention
high enough to cover the costs of creation (adjusted upward for the
creator's ab ante risks of failure). Let us call that price "P-prime."
Unfortunately, any replicator will face the same problem as
would have been faced by the creator herself, namely, competition
from customers who themselves will copy. Therefore no replicator or
group of replicators is likely to emerge that is willing to pay a price P-
prime.1 If that happens, creativity again will have insufficient
incentives.18
Enter Intellectual Property Rights ("IPRs"). Patent law permits
a potential inventor to distinguish between someone who wants to use
her widget-making machine to make widgets, and someone who
wants to use the machine as a prototype for manufacturing identical
widget-making equipment. Similarly, copyright enables a potential
novelist or songwriter to effectually distinguish between readers or
listeners on the one hand, and publishers or record companies on the
other. That is because any person who buys a copy of a book or song
or machine has a legal duty to refrain from copying it without the
creator's permission. 19 Someone who wishes to replicate the product
Wendy J. Gordon & Robert Bone, The Economics of Copyright, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS (Edward Elgar & The University of Ghent, forthcoming 1999); Wendy J.
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989); Tom G. Palmer,
Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV.
261 (1989).
17. The caveats are well-known here, as well. For example, there might be an initial class
of customers willing to pay P-prime because their internal valuations are high, independent of
any possible revenue from copying.
18. The world where there are no IPRs should not be confused with a world where there
are some IPRs which provide less than perfect price discrimination. The latter is the situation of
the companies that own movie copyrights today, as discussed infra in text accompanying notes
26-32.
19. In addition, patent law forbids even independent replication. That feature of patent
law is usually explained by the frequency with which different groups racing to solve the same
scientific problem may reach the same conclusion independently. It is argued that a "winner-
take-all" reward (given to the first inventor to succeed) is necessary if potential innovators are
to have sufficient incentives to enter the race ab ante. Examining this logic would take us
outside the scope of the instant paper.
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must identify himself and negotiate a separate deal with the creator
or face liability and, potentially, criminal sanctions.20
Since the users who place a higher value on access to an
embodiment will often be the users who plan to copy and resell it, the
law's restraint on replication provides creators a means by which to
divide most of the customers with high valuations from most of the
customers whose valuations are low. The creator (or her employer or
her assigns) can then charge different prices to each group. Further,
since the law forbids copying regardless of where an embodiment was
purchased, a replicator will gain nothing by purchasing a cheap copy
from a consumer, or by pretending to be a consumer and purchasing a
cheap consumer copy. Thus IPRs discourage arbitrage between high-
and low-valuation markets.2'
Under today's copyright practice, a free-lance author typically
sells a copy of her manuscript and an exclusive right to reproduce it22
to a single publisher for P-prime (say, an advance of $100,000). The
publisher then resells copies to the members of the public at P (say,
$20 per book). In the patent field, many inventors are employees
who immediately assign their patents to their employing firm. The
inventors receive a salary. The employing firms typically either sell
embodiments of the invention to the public at P, or license another
firm or finite group of firms to produce the invention for a fee of P-
prime.
In neither the case of freelancers nor in the case of employee
creators will copies be sold at P-marginal (the cost of physically
making an additional embodiment), until the term of the copyright or
patent has expired. It is hoped that by that time, a socially desirable
work will have brought the creator (or her employer or assigns) more
than P-prime.
The intellectual property law thus provides incentives by giving
potential creators or their employers the prospect of covering
creation costs by means of price discrimination. The price discrimina-
tion so provided is, by design, not perfect. This is perhaps easiest to
20. For further development, see Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 211-66 (1992) and Wendy J.
Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
449, 472-77 (1992).
21. The profit earned by a buyer who resells to a higher-valuation purchaser is known as
"arbitrage." Where arbitrage is easy, price discrimination is difficult.
22. Publishing contracts typically focus on the author's assignment of exclusive rights
rather than on sale of a copy. Such contracts do not have to specify that a manuscript copy is
being provided; that is understood, since the copyright is useless without a copy to work from.
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see in copyright law.23 The primary grant of rights in U.S. copyright
law appears in section 106. It provides that, "[s]ubject to" various
exceptions,
[T]he owner of copyright.., has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly;
and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.24
Note that the statute gives copyright owners no right to control
private performances (such as singing in the shower or playing a
videocassette on one's living-room VCR). Further, the rights are
subject to various exceptions, including the liberty that the First Sale
Doctrine gives purchasers of lawfully-made copies and phonorecords
to resell or rent the embodiments they have bought.25
Note also that IPRs do not need to provide perfect price discrimi-
nation in order to perform their primary economic function: enabling
a creator (or her employer or assigns) to sell embodiments at a price
above their marginal cost. This can be seen by considering the
situation of movie copyrights.
American copyright law gives the owners of motion picture
copyrights no legal rights by which to distinguish between end-users
23. Patent law gives patentees control over the "making, using, offering for sale, or selling
the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States."
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1997). "[I]f the invention is a process," then the rights granted are
slightly different: "the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling.. . or
importing ... products made by that process." Id.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1997).
25. The "First Sale Doctrine" gets its name from the way that it exhausts the copyright
owner's right to control the distribution of a particular copy or phonorecord, under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(3), with the first sale of that embodiment. The Doctrine is recognized in 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(a) (1997).
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(who buy movie cassettes to see at home) and video rental shops.
This is because the First Sale Doctrine limits a copyright owner's right
to control distribution of copies.2 6 A difficult choice results for the
movies' copyright owners. Selling cassettes at a low price aimed at
consumers will mean the copyright proprietors will forego the high
prices that video rental stores would have paid. Selling cassettes at a
high price will mean foregoing most sales to consumers.
Nevertheless, the business of making movies and selling movie
cassettes continues. 27
One reason for the apparent continued viability of the market for
movies and movie cassettes is the law's prohibition against copying
and public performance. These prohibitions are too coarse-grained to
themselves enable movie makers to charge a rental store more for
cassettes than they would charge a consumer,28 but they do make
other revenues available to the copyright proprietors. 29 In addition,
and most tellingly, the prohibition on copying makes possible selling
to the video stores at a price above marginal cost.
Video stores are willing to pay more than P-marginal because,
unlike the replicators in the "no IPR" world, a video rental store that
purchases copies from copyright proprietors at price P will face
competition only from shops that bear roughly the same costs that the
store itself does. Shops that rent or sell pirate copies to the public will
presumably be sued30 before their super-low fees ruin the stores that
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), discussed supra at note 25. In addition, since a copyright
owner's right to control performance is limited to "public" performance, he cannot charge a fee
each time a privately owned cassette is played in a living room. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (6).
27. By using this example, I do not mean to indicate that the optimal number of movies is
being made or that the optimal number of copies is being distributed. It may be that more (or
fewer) movies should be made and sold. That is an issue to be separately determined. My point
is that such issues of incentives must be determined before we know how much price discrimina-
tion, and how many tools for achieving market dominance, are necessary.
Apparently, when it came to software and music, Congress was persuaded that the First
Sale Doctrine did need to be amended in order to provide incentives. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)
(certain commercial renting of records and software placed in the control of copyright owners).
28. Another reason for the apparent viability of the cassette market may be the availability
of price discrimination methods that do not depend on law, such as temporal discrimination:
pricing a cassette high in the first few weeks (given that video stores often profit from
trumpeting quick availability), and pricing it lower after time passes (when most video stores
may already have bought their copies).
29. For example, movie theaters and television broadcasters will pay for the right to
"publicly perform" the film and to have copies of it. Therefore, cassette sales to rental stores
and the public need not be as high as they would need to be if they were a movie maker's only
revenue source.
30. The First Sale Doctrine applies only to copies that are "lawfully made." See 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(a). As to pirate copies, the copyright owner has a right to control their distribution,
including resale and rental.
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purchase copies through legitimate channels.
In sum, what intellectual property does is provide the writer or
inventor a tool with which to distinguish classes of buyers. She
cannot perfectly divide all buyers by the intensity of their valuations,3'
but she does possess a legal device for provoking self-selection by
customers who plan certain typical, commercially-significant uses that
involve differing intensities. Patent and copyright force such
purchasers to identify themselves and bargain separately from
ordinary purchasers, or face legal penalties for carrying out their
plans without permission.3 2
Not every intellectual product is covered by an IPR. Whether
the public gains or loses by such lacunae is a matter for factual
investigation. For example, consider databases.
Many databases lie outside federal copyright. Some argue this is
undesirable since databases can be expensive to create and cheap to
copy. On the other hand, databases are an unusual product. Unlike
the typical literary work, a database is something that an individual
user or small group of users might value at a price close to P-prime. If
so, it is possible that in her initial sale a database creator could recoup
her costs and compensation for her risk.33  From the public's
perspective, such a creator does not need to price discriminate.3 " (Of
course, from the creator's perspective, the more revenue the better-
and price discrimination produces more revenue.)
II. WHAT'S IN A NAME?
It might be asked why this matters. The answer is that the
concept of "price discrimination" is currently popular, as both a tool
and a solution, among courts and commentators. When faced with
apparent shortfalls in traditional IPR protection, such as the refusal
of copyright to protect many databases, an increasingly common
31. Note that a recent article points out that intellectual property owners might not need to
divide buyers by the intensity of their valuations in order to effectively price discriminate. See
Yannis Bakos et al., Shared Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117 (1999).
32. To avoid liability, potential replicators declare their identity, self-selecting in what
resembles a classic form of second-degree price discrimination. See LOUIS PHLIPS, THE
ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION (1983).
33. Game theory, studies of industry practice, and other theoretical and empirical aids
would help us to determine whether or not the end-users who have a high individual value for
the database would indeed pay a high price. There are obvious incentives for an individual
potential purchaser to hold out and later copy from those entities that did purchase an initial
copy.
34. In this defined situation, she will produce her database even without the ability to
control copying or disposition after the first sale.
19981
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response is "to foster price discrimination."
Many lawyers feel more comfortable with the use of price dis-
crimination terminology in the contract than they will be with the
notion that intellectual property law itself provides incentives by
fostering price discrimination. Our lawyerly discomfort stems from
our habit of seeing the individual rights granted by an intellectual
property statute as separate "products" to be separately sold or
licensed. We usually see the "right to reproduce" and the "right to
make a derivative work" from a movie script as separate from the
"right to read" it. And each of these in turn can be seen as separate
from the "right to perform the script publicly." From that conceptual
perspective, it is not "price discrimination" to charge one price, P, for
the right to read a movie script, and another price P-prime, for the
right to reproduce the script or adapt it for the screen, because the
right to read and the right to reproduce or adapt are all seen as
different commodities.35 But that habit of seeing separate products is
a straightforward matter of conceptual choice.
Alternatively, we can see that in both situations an identical
object-a copy of the script-is being sold, and that the rights
function to enable a copyright owner to distinguish between different
intensities of script-buyer preference. Once the script is written, the
cost of making a photocopy for a movie studio is the same as the cost
of making a photocopy for a drama student, even though each
purchaser wishes to exercise different liberties in regard to the
script.36
To see each right as a separate product is a form of "reification":
seeing concepts as things.37 One purpose of economics is to help us
see through forms of words to their actual functioning. But
sometimes economics can be used to substitute for one misleading
form of words another equally opaque. As will be discussed below, in
ProCD and since, "price discrimination" is a potentially misleading
form of words having an undeserved vogue.
A definitional problem of a more formal nature should also be
noted. "Price discrimination" refers to charging different buyers
35. I am indebted to Jack Balkin here.
36. The studio may want a liberty to make the script into a movie, and that right must be
purchased. The student may want a liberty to read the script for homework. For this no explicit
license need be purchased.
37. The literature on reification is immense. Here I use the word in its simplest sense.
"Res" is Latin for "thing," and to "reify" a concept is to treat it as if it existed as a thing
neutrally appearing in the world rather than as an intellectual construct.
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different net prices for the same quantity of the same commodity. An
invention or writing sold to a consumer (end user) can be seen as
"one copy" of the product. A product sold to a commercial copyist
can be conceptualized as "many copies" since it is in fact likely to
result in many copies being made. It can be argued that copyright
and patent are not forms of price discrimination, because they merely
allow a writer or inventor to charge more for more embodiments.
However, in all cases the customer is the purchaser of a single
copy of the information. The information simply happens to be an
input capable of generating copies of itself. As such, it is only one of
many kinds of products that are capable of being used both for an end
use and an input use. (That is, information is one of many products
capable of being used both as a consumption good and a capital
good). Consider seed corn. Someone who sells corn to purchasers
who want to eat it may also sell corn to purchasers who want to plant
it. The latter purchaser is using the corn to generate copies of itself.
Nevertheless, should the seller endeavor to charge different prices to
the two groups of purchasers, his efforts would be characterized as
price discrimination.3 8
The issue is utility and consistency of definitions.3 9 Just as easily
38. For the formulation in this paragraph, I am indebted to Michael Meurer.
39. I am indebted to Ted Sims for identifying the quantity issue.
Another definitional issue should be mentioned as well. Price discrimination occurs where
"two varieties of a commodity are sold (by the same seller) to two buyers at different net prices,
the net price being the price (paid by the buyer) corrected for the cost associated with the
product differentiation." PHLIPS, supra note 32, at 6 (emphasis in original). By a "cost
associated with the product differentiation," Phlips has in mind items such as transportation to
the consumer. See id. at 6-7.
An item priced at $600 when for sale at a market that the seller reached by spending $100
on transport has a "net price" of $500. This is the same "net price" as the identical item whose
price tag is $700 but which is located at a market that the seller spent $200 in reaching. There is
no price discrimination between those two items, despite the difference in price tags, because of
the difference in cost.
Phlips's analysis thus directs us to identify what "costs" may be attached to different
embodiments. In ProCD and similar cases, the issue becomes comparing the cost of producing
an embodiment that can be used only by an ultimate consumer, and an embodiment that can be
commercially replicated. If there are cost differences significant enough to account fully for the
pricing differences, then there is no "price discrimination" (technically speaking).
Ordinarily the costs in making a "commercial" version of a work and a "consumer" version
of it would seem to fall far short of explaining the large difference in price seen in cases such as
ProCD. (If this is not so, there is no price discrimination.) But even where the physical costs of
production are the same for the two embodiments, there is one element that might be described
as "cost" that will indeed differ. This is the "cost" of profits from future sales that will be lost.
Attached to the sale of a copy to a "commercial" client is the risk that a significant loss in
profits will occur if the client copies and sells the work to people who would otherwise be paying
customers of the original manufacturer. Should profits from such lost sales be treated as "costs
associated with the product differentiation" under Phlips's definition?
Counting "lost profits" as costs would be a difficult standard to administer and is
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as we can conceptualize one computer disk as equal to the many disks
that can be made from it, we can conceptualize "quantity" as equal to
intensity of use. It is a classic concern of price discriminators to
distinguish among consumers whose valuation differs because they
have differing intensities of use. Differing intensities therefore do
not, in the antitrust literature or the other areas where "price discrim-
ination" is studied, mean that different products or different
quantities are involved.
Moreover, Judge Easterbrook, too, treats as "price discrimina-
tion" the ability to charge one price to parties likely to make one or
no copies, and another price to parties likely to make many copies.40
Since this essay addresses how the "price discrimination" concept is
being employed by lawyers and judges, the fact that my usage is
subject to the same quibble as Judge Easterbrook's is a virtue rather
than a vice.
III. PRoCD, INC. V. ZEIDENBERG
In contract's march to conquer copyright, ProCD41 constitutes a
victory for contract so complete that it threatens copyright's very
ability to mount a defense. In ProCD, Judge Frank Easterbrook had
to evaluate the legality of a shrinkwrap 42 license contract, and a term
within the purported contract stating that purchasers of the CD-ROM
at issue were forbidden to make commercial use of the database the
disk contained.43  That database, an extensive but essentially
contravened by ordinary economic usage. Not only are lost profits fairly speculative, but in
addition they are remarkably dependent upon the law's specification of entitlements. If I have
an "exclusive right" over all reproductions of my work, then I have a potential market of all
copies, and any copies sold by a stranger are "lost sales" with regard to me. If my rights are less
extensive, then so are my potential "lost sales." For these and related reasons, it is at least
arguably proper to use the term "price discrimination" to describe pricing differences between
two identical items, produced at the same physical cost, even if sending one of the items into the
stream of commerce will cause a competitive harm to the seller in the form of "lost future
profits" that sale of the other item will not cause.
40. The contract terms at issue in ProCD can be seen as distinguishing between the price
for one copy of the database (sold to the ordinary consumer) and many copies (sold to the
commercial buyer).
41. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
42. The "shrinkwrap" license gets its name from the fact that retail software packages
are covered in plastic or cellophane "shrinkwrap," and some vendors, though not
ProCD, have written licenses that become effective as soon as the customer tears the
wrapping from the package.
Id. at 1449.
43. See id. at 1450. According to the opinion, plaintiff ProCD spent many millions of
dollars to compile and update its data. See id. at 1449; see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908
F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (discussing plaintiff's efforts), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
[Vol. 73:1367
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS PRICE DISCRIMINATION
unoriginal set of telephone-book entries, was probably uncopyrighta-
ble." Copyright law, therefore, could not prevent a purchaser from
making and selling innumerable copies of the database, or (as
defendant Mr. Zeidenberg did) from posting his copy of the database
on the Web and charging his own customers for access to it.
Under the purported contract, by contrast, a purchaser of the
disk could do none of these things. The question thus raised (though
not in these words) was whether directories of names and numbers
that federal copyright places in the public domain should constitute
part of the commons free for all to use, or whether a publisher who
has put such public-domain material on a CD-ROM disk should be
able to employ state contract law to impose restraints on its re-use.
As a good legal realist and member of the Chicago School, Judge
Easterbrook evaluated not only the state of the written law, but also
the question of whether the purported license term would work to the
benefit of consumers generally.45  He found that it did.46
Enforcement, Judge Easterbrook thought, would assist the distributor
in being able to charge two prices for the same CD-ROM database-
one low price for ordinary consumers, and a much higher price for
commercial users-and that as a result of this dual pricing structure,
the price to the ordinary person could be kept low and the quantity of
copies distributed could be increased.47  Easterbrook called this
device "price discrimination," 48 and, obviously viewing price discrimi-
1996). The defendant, Matthew Zeidenberg, bought a "consumer package" of the database,
and made it "available... to anyone willing to pay [his] price-which, needless to say, is less
than ProCD charges its commercial customers." ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
Since the consumer package contained a writing that purported to prohibit commercial
use, see id., ProCD sued Zeidenberg for breach of contract. The District Court held that the
breach of contract suit could not proceed because the shrinkwrap license was invalid and
because federal copyright law pre-empted the contract's applicability. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp.
at 655, 659. Judge Easterbrook reversed, and directed the lower court to enter a judgment for
the plaintiff. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
44. Judge Easterbrook treats it as such, though, as he notes, the database may have had a
more plausible claim to "originality" than did the white-pages phone book declared uncopy-
rightable in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See
Easterbrook's opinion in ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
45. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449-50.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1449-50, 1455.
48. See id. at 1449. "Price Discrimination" is typically defined as a difference in price
charged to different customers for the same commodity. See PHLIPS, supra note 32, at 5 (noting
the traditional economic definition of price discrimination).
The term price discrimination had a negative connotation in the past, being associated with
various unsavory business practices, see NEIL M. SINGER, PUBLIC MICROECONOMiCS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT FINANCE 85 (2d ed. 1976) (noting that usury laws, minimum-
wage laws, and truth-in-lending laws all arose as a popular response to the perceived evils of
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nation as a good thing in the context, upheld the license term against
challenges brought both under state law and under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.
The Supremacy Clause challenge arose because if federal law is
to be the "supreme law of the land," state law must give way when it
enters onto territory which is exclusively federal, or when it threatens
to interfere with federal law. Back in the far-off days when the 1976
Copyright Act was adopted, no one imagined that contracts could
accomplish what copyright accomplishes. Copyright is a rule
applicable to everyone. Contracts are expensive to negotiate,
individually-crafted arrangements between individual signatories.
The legislative history thus reflects an assumption that contracts by
their nature are incapable of usurping exclusive federal territory.49
But as the digital era progresses, contract and content alike
proliferate with the flick of a keyboard button. With the increased
use of standardized terms in "shrinkwrap" and "click-through"
formats, and new statutory prohibitions that penalize efforts to bypass
the copyright proprietor's technical gateways, 0 the contracts attached
to copies of a given work are likely to be cheap, uniform, and nearly
ubiquitous. Thus digital technology and its legal accompaniments
begin to bridge the gap between federal copyright and state contract
law."
price discrimination), and with the statutory prohibitions of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1997) (forbidding price discrimination "where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition" or to have other specified anti-competitive effects).
Price discrimination increases the profits that flow to a monopolist. In recent years, however,
policymakers and economists have increasingly explored the possible merits of price discrimina-
tion as a way to increase the quantity of goods produced by monopolists. Some scholars seem to
have been downright seduced by its possibilities.
49. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 132 (1976).
50. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (1997). "No person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected [by copyright] under this title." Id.
§ 1201(a)(1)(A). Thus, if Database Proprietor Mr. X makes his uncopyrightable database
available only in a format which also includes some copyrightable material (such as programs
that enable the data to be manipulated, or a narrative description of the database's properties),
the new statute would assist Mr. X. It would back up the technical devices he employs to keep
people from accessing the database without having signed a contract. Admittedly, the statute
makes some effort to protect the public's "ability to make noninfringing uses" of particular
classes of works, see id. § 1201(a)(1)(B), but it is unclear whether that ability will in fact be
safeguarded. Note, further, that the statute nowhere makes it unlawful to use encryption and
other technical gates to "lock up" public domain material.
All contracts require leverage. Being able to lock something up gives one the power to sell
or rent the key, at a price and on conditions.
51. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 108-13 (1997); Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in
Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587 (1997). These developments are leading me to
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The pre-emption issues so raised by ProCD are complex.5 2
Equally complex are the technical and normative issues of private law
raised by the case.53 Of equal or greater difficulty are the welfare
questions, in particular, the validity vel non of Judge Easterbrook's
argument that because of price discrimination, social welfare would
increase if the database at issue were made subject to the purported
contract's restraints.
Economists agree that price discrimination can increase social
welfare under certain stringently defined conditions of monopoly.5 4
That is because price discrimination can ameliorate the quantity
restraints that a monopolist ordinarily employs to keep revenue high.
But in ProCD it is not clear what pre-existing monopoly needed to be
encouraged to expand its output. In fact, in ProCD-and for
databases generally-the issue is whether the producer should have a
monopoly.
The economists give us a predictable recipe for approaching that
question: a monopoly in intellectual products (or any other system of
copying restraint) is economically worthwhile if the benefits it
produces outweigh its costs. To evaluate the benefits of such a
monopoly, we would ideally try to discover what works would not
appear without the incentive of the monopoly to lure them forth, and
calculate their value. To evaluate the monopoly's costs, we would
rethink portions of my own position on the gap between contract and copyright. See Wendy J.
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1413-22 (1989).
52. For example: Did Congress mean to put uncreative databases permanently in the
public domain? Given the nature of the Copyright Clause, is Congress empowered (or on the
other hand, is it mandated) to do so? What standard should be used to determine if a state is
granting rights "equivalent to" copyrights, or whether state law is interfering with the
achievement of federal goals?
53. For example: Not only is the ProCD type of contract dictated by one side of the
transaction and not seen at the time the consumer makes her purchase-thus raising concerns
about autonomy-but the contract term also imposed a "restraint on alienation" of a form the
common law has long disdained.
54. See Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright
Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 896-98 (1997). Speaking generally,
monopolists will produce at a rate that maximizes their revenue but which is sub-optimal from
the perspective of social welfare because the monopolist's greatest profit comes (if he charges
only one price) at a point where he is supplying less than competitive quantity. By price dis-
crimination (charging more than one price for the same commodity), the monopolist captures
some of the consumers' surplus, and can increase revenue by increasing his quantity of
production. This reduces the allocative shortfall that would have been created by the low level
of quantity produced. The general dynamic is explained in Fisher, supra note 12, at 1236-39.
55. See Stanley J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, in 8
RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 181
(John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986). To this might be added any benefits from
centralization, see Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977).
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count up the value lost from factors such as (a) the restraints on
access that the system imposes on works that would have been
produced anyway;5 6 (b) works not produced or not disseminated
because they needed to build on prior works in ways not permitted by
the legal restraints; 7 (c) efforts or expenditures spent on "reinventing
the wheel" that would not have been necessary if copying had been
permitted;58 and (d) the administrative costs of the system. 9
In sum, the key issue for a system of intellectual product
regulation is whether the restraints it empowers brings forth enough
works that would not have otherwise been produced to make the
system's costs worthwhile. But although Judge Easterbrook
examines some empirical data, the facts pull both ways,6° and at no
point does the court make a finding that contractual restraints of this
kind are in fact necessary to lure databases like this into being. Only
if the restraints possessed such incentive power would we be in a
realm where monopoly of any kind-and price discrimination as
ameliorative-would be useful.61
Consider, here, Judge Easterbrook's logic:
If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by
charging a single price-that is, if it could not charge more to
commercial users than to the general public -it would have to raise
the price substantially over $150. The ensuing reduction in sales
would harm consumers who value the information at, say, $200.
They get consumer surplus of $50 under the current arrangement
but would cease to buy if the price rose substantially. If... the only
way to make a profit turned out to be a price attractive to
commercial users alone, then all consumers would lose out-and so
56. This would include, for example, the welfare loss a prospective purchaser would
experience if the artificially high price enabled by the monopoly precluded her purchase. See
the discussion of "deadweight loss" in Fisher, supra note 12, at 1236, 1240.
57. We might call this "free speech costs." For example, in cases where a parodist or critic
is judged to have copied "too much" of the parodied work to avail himself of the Fair Use
Doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1997), the parody or critique is subject to injunction.
58. Identifying this problem is usually credited to Bob Gorman.
59. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
60. "The database ... cost more than $10 million to compile and is expensive to keep
current" ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). Yet, as Judge
Easterbrook notes, the database "is much more valuable to some users than to others. The
combination of names, addresses, and SIC codes enables manufacturers to compile lists of
potential customers. Manufacturers and retailers pay high prices to specialized information
intermediaries for such mailing lists; ProCD offers a potentially cheaper alternative." Id. Judge
Easterbrook did not explore the latter fact, but it means that that retailers and manufacturers
might as customers pay enough in an initial sale of the database to more than cover creation
costs. See supra note 17.
61. For a useful investigation of price discrimination in the copyright context, see Meurer,
supra note 54, at 849.
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would the commercial clients, who would have to pay more for the
listings because ProCD could not obtain any contribution toward
costs from the consumer market.62
But is the result so clear? If the commercial price were $500, say, and
even one of ProCD's commercial customers reproduced the database
for resale, that copyist would likely charge consumers something far
less than ProCD's price. The consumer would no longer lose out, she
would just buy a cheap copy from the replicator.
I do not claim that this is a necessarily good result.63 My point is
that these are difficult empirical questions of a kind Congress is best
able to resolve.
Recall that Judge Easterbrook's conclusion regarding the virtues
of price discrimination was premised, as the opinion says, on ProCD
being able to charge "a single price." 64 But in a realm without legal or
technological systems to control copying, ProCD could not easily
control price at all-neither a single price nor a dual-price structure.
That is because purchasers of ProCD's disks could reproduce and sell
the database at prices different from, and presumably lower than,
ProCD's. Just as an enforceable contractual restraint (or other form
of restraint) makes price discrimination possible, it is just such
restraints which are necessary if a seller is to charge "one price"
which constitutes the only price in the market.
In comparison with a monopolist charging a single price, a
monopolist with a price-discrimination structure might be preferable.
But in comparison with lawful free copying and a resulting range of
62. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
63. For example, the existence of the copying might force ProCD to further raise its price
to commercial customers, which in turn might lead to even commercial customers purchasing
"unauthorized" copies, which in turn might drive ProCD into bankruptcy or discourage others
from going into the business of database creation. In addition, Jane Ginsburg has suggested in
conversation that the presence of high prices for commercial databases may mean that no copies
at all get out to consumers. After all, how much would someone pay for a copy if his only
interest was in selling copies of it? In a world without IPRs (or high-value initial customers or
some other device to gain market power), once consumer copies were widely distributed,
additional parties could soon enter the market and compete. This prospect of falling prices and
profit could discourage anyone from going into the business of making and selling consumer
copies. Therefore, Professor Ginsburg argues, the presence of high prices for commercial
databases may mean that no copies at all get out to consumers.
The point is a good one. But everything depends upon the particular facts. Imagine for
example three retailers exist that can use the database to reach new customers, and that perhaps
each of these companies values access to the database (for this nonreplicative purpose) at one-
third of P-prime. If each paid one-third of P-prime for a copy, all three would have an economic
motive (barring community, contextual, or legal restraints) to buy a "commercial" version of the
database and open a sideline business as a seller of cheap copies or cheap Web access to the
public.
64. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
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prices, the advantages of price discrimination are (to say the least)
hardly so clear. The opinion seems to assume that the choice is
between a monopoly with no price discrimination -where the seller
puts only one price on the database copies it sells-and a monopoly
that contains some price discrimination.
Perhaps Judge Easterbrook was assuming that the "commercial"
copies of the database were subject to contractual restraints on
copying that would escape pre-emption 6 regardless of welfare effects.
If these were the facts and the law, then a "commercial" buyer could
not lawfully become a replicator.66 But to move logically from that
complex set of assumptions (which was itself never stated) to a
judgment that welfare would be increased by subjecting the
"consumer" to a shrinkwrap copying restraint, the opinion would
need to contain additional findings.
Such findings are possible. For example, it might be
economically desirable to enforce the shrinkwrap restraint on
consumer purchasers like Zeidenberg if the total revenue available to
ProCD from commercial customers was far beneath P-prime (leaving
ProCD in need of significant revenues from the consumer market)
and if the consumer market could only be effectively exploited if the
law prevented the Zeidenbergs of the world from sharing the
database commercially. Alternatively, even if one or more
commercial customers paid P-prime to ProCD, it might be
economically desirable to enforce a restraint on Zeidenberg if in the
future commercial clients would purchase from Zeidenbergs rather
than from database originators like ProCD . But Judge
Easterbrook's opinion fails to address these points, and at least some
literature suggests that commercial clients want format, accuracy,
updating and debugging that a Zeidenberg's copy could not provide.
In the wake of the 1991 Feist decision, where the Supreme Court
first declared laborious compilations uncopyrightable if "unorigi-
65. This is far from an absurd assumption. Although the District Court opinion focused on
the "consumer" version of the disks, that opinion could be read as indicating that even
"commercial" versions carried with them a prohibition on copying. See ProCD, Inc. v
Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996). Commercial buyers are more likely to
negotiate real contracts than are consumers who buy off the shelf, and negotiated contracts are
more likely to escape pre-emption than are shrinkwrap contracts.
66. In such a case, the proper basis of comparison would indeed be "one high price"-
because no one who had a copy would be free to recopy it for consumers.
67. That is, enforcing the constraints would be desirable if ProCD would be unwilling to
distribute any copies to the consumer market in the absence of enforceable shrinkwrap
constraints, and if none of ProCD's commercial clients made copies for consumers.
[Vol. 73:1367
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS PRICE DISCRIMINATION
nal, ' '68 observers were often concerned about the ability of the
database industry to continue. Yet many published reports suggest
the industry experienced no significant difficulties in the wake of the
Feist decision.69 Revenues kept flowing to the producers of even un-
copyrightable databases because purchasers wanted to obtain
features that copyists could not provide: speedy and physically
convenient modes of presentation, quick update services, guarantees
of quality, or the like.70
This suggests it is at least possible that ProCD would have kept a
large portion of its customers even if commercial use and copying of
the database were allowed-that is, ProCD may have produced the
database even if it could not employ shrinkwrap licenses at all.71 If
this is the likely scenario, then the shrinkwrap license validated by
ProCD merely imposed restraints on use, and consequently increases
in price and decreases in the quantity of databases available. It made
68. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
69. See, e.g., Presentation by David 0. Carson, Esq., 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 997, 1000
(1992). Thus, though "copyright cannot be relied upon to prevent a competitor from lifting
factual data from a database to use in preparing a competing product," in two days of 1998
hearings "only one of fourteen witnesses described a situation in which he had suffered harm by
the alleged extraction of information from his database." Database Antipiracy Legislation:
Chronology, Status Report and Analysis (last modified Oct. 2, 1998) <http://www.aalp.org/
piracy.html>.
I must admit, however, that some of the continuity in database revenues may have been
due to the presumed availability of contract enforcement. See Carson, supra, at 1001; see also
Paul T. Sheils & Robert Penchina, What's All the Fuss About Feist? The Sky is Not Falling on
the Intellectual Property Rights of Online Database Proprietors, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 563,
575-76 (1992).
70. Thus, Steven Metalitz, Vice President and General Counsel of the Information
Industry Association, noted:
Within weeks after the [Feist] decision [put white pages into the public domain],
information crossed my desk about a new CD-ROM product that consisted of scanning
white pages onto CD-ROM. That product has proven successful and fills a market
need. But at the same time the licensing agreement [by which a user agrees to pay the
original producer for access], even for telephone directories, is essential if you want the
best possible product. If you want the most up-to-date listings, you do not want to wait
until the directory comes out, you want to license the tapes of updates immediately,
and for a variety of other reasons, while you may be able to make a non-infringing
product without a licensing agreement, you are, in most cases, going to make a better
product with a licensing agreement.
Presentation by Steven J. Metalitz, Esq., 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 775, 783 (1992) (for his
institutional affiliation, see 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 763 n.*). To similar effect see, e.g., Alfred
C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright and the
Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343, 1369 (1991). The classic discussion of non-
copyright modes of collecting revenues for intangibles is Breyer, supra note 16. Also see
Palmer, supra note 16.
71. This assumes ProCD would have had enough revenue to justify its investment even if
some outliers, like Mr. Zeidenberg, would buy a copy only to recopy it or sell cheap access to it
on the Web. Recall that this is presented merely as a hypothesis; I have no more proof than
Judge Easterbrook did on the issue of whether in fact the contract terms constituted a necessary
incentive to initial production.
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things worse, not better, for consumers.
It is all a matter of what baseline one chooses for comparison. It
is only when one begins from assuming that a "single price" can be
charged that price discrimination looks like a good thing. But to
charge a single price, a producer needs market power, at the extreme
a monopoly. One should not give such market power in the name of
fostering price discrimination.
Let us return briefly to the issue of federal supremacy over state
contract law. If what occurred in ProCD is defined as "price discrimi-
nation," then the same definition of "price discrimination" covers
copyright's method of fostering incentives. That means that even if
price discrimination is a Good Idea, it's a Congressional Good Idea.
This perception might raise more pre-emption difficulties than
Easterbrook was willing to face. For if federal copyright law is using
the same device as the purported contract term, but is applying that
device differently, it certainly raises the possibility that wholesale
enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses terms of this type might interfere
with congressional objectives.
IV. PROFESSOR FISHER AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
In an article entitled Property and Contract on the Internet,
William Fisher III argues that the law should "facilitate" creators'
shifting away from reliance on IPRs and toward reliance on "a
combination of contractual rights and technological protections."72
The supposed virtues of price discrimination play a large role in his
argument.73 Yet Professor Fisher compares (as Judge Easterbrook
did) the effects of monopoly lacking price discrimination, on the one
hand, with, on the other, monopoly coupled with price discrimina-
tion.74 He then argues, unsurprisingly, that the former imposes higher
welfare costs than the latter. Unfortunately, the Fisher essay leaps
from that conclusion to the recommendation that courts and
legislatures should foster price discrimination by enforcing
contractual restraints on copying.
What Professor Fisher neglects is that an information producer is
unlikely to have a monopoly to begin with unless the law imposes
72. See Fisher, supra note 12, at 1203. Professor Fisher also argues that the law should
simultaneously require that "such 'private' arrangements abide by restrictions designed to
protect the public interest," id., such as a protection for fair use, id. at 1246-47, 1250-52.
73. See id. at 1234-40, 1251-52
74. See id. at 1234-40.
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restraints on copying. And whether such a restraint should be
enforced is precisely the question to be decided in the contract cases,
and precisely the question that intellectual property law has
historically been entrusted with deciding.75
Instead of comparing two monopoly scenarios, Professor Fisher
should be comparing monopoly with a mixture of monopoly and
competition. If a comparison is made between, on the one hand, a
situation where monopoly is coupled with price discrimination, and,
on the other hand, a situation where there are many competing
sellers, the latter price will be considerably lower than the price under
price discrimination. Also, the quantity of embodiments produced
75. For this reason (among others), I find surprising Professor Fisher's assumption that a
court would find it difficult to hold contracts like that in ProCD pre-empted. See id. at 1254.
Even more surprising is his apparent relative indifference to whether or not courts should
enforce Internet distributors' efforts to restrain commercial copying and other activities beyond
the period of copyright expiration. See id. at 1248-52. He views such efforts as "somehow
offensive" and something that we should "plausib[ly]" prohibit but which he thinks cause "[n]o
great harm." See id. at 1249-50. Accordingly, he seems to prefer other strategies over adopting
outright prohibitions on contractual restraints that seek to operate beyond a copyright's term.
See id. at 1251-52.
Should the Internet come to dominate our society as the delivery source for musical and
literary works, paper copies of classics could become hard or cumbersome to find. It seems
inadvisable (to say the least) for state law to empower an Internet provider to decide when and
under what terms an orchestra can perform Beethoven symphonies, or a publishing company
can reprint Shakespeare's sonnets, or a Tom Stoppard can write a play that quotes liberally
from Hamlet.
James Molloy has argued in conversation that competition among Net providers will keep
the fees that any provider charges for reproduction and performance quite low. But, abstract
models of free competition aside, I doubt those fees would be zero. Today, anyone can go to a
library, take home a volume of Shakespeare's plays, photocopy enough copies for her theater
group, and perform any of the plays-for free or for a hefty admission charge-without
violating anyone's rights or asking anyone's permission. That should not change.
I suspect that Professor Fisher would not disagree with the general point I raise here. But
as written, his current proposals would permit only "browsing" in libraries' computers, see id. at
1251, and not copying. He seems to endorse contractual restraints without regard to whether
material is in the public domain. True, he argues that certain activities should be privileged
(such as educational and political uses, see id. at 1250), but even commercial uses of our
common heritage can provide significant public benefit at fairly low cost to each of us
individually. (Consider in this regard Kenneth Branagh's excellent film versions of
Shakespeare's plays.)
Moreover, it is hard to imagine how a regime of technological protections buttressed by
contract could even distinguish between favored and nonfavored uses without significantly
eroding privacy. Professor Fisher suggests that the law "allow creators to bury in their products
devices that prevented serial copying, thus reducing the risk that the material, once made
available without charge to privileged users, would become available for free to all users." Id. at
1251. But a privileged user can simply retype the literary work, or turn on a tape recorder as he
plays the delivered music loudly, in order to obtain a physically unrestricted copy which he can
then resell to others. Therefore, deliverers of content are unlikely to be satisfied with devices to
prevent serial copying. If contractual restraints were also available to them, the issue would
then be how to distinguish between privileged and nonprivileged users without invading the
privacy of both groups. Professor Fisher does note the importance of privacy issues, see id. at
1248 n.ll1.
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will be at least as great. Both from an allocative and distributional
perspective, therefore, provided that incentives are otherwise
accounted for, the competitive solution will be better than a price dis-
crimination scenario.
Admittedly, if there is need for copying restraints in order to
produce an increase in incentives, then it may be advisable to enforce
such restraints. If so, it may be advisable to enforce the copying
restraints in a way that permits many rather than few sub-markets for
price discrimination purposes. But that will not necessarily be the
case.
The foregoing is a subtle point that needs restating: Even where
empirical evidence suggests that some monopoly power 76 is a good
idea for the purpose of increasing incentives, it is not necessarily a
good thing to increase the amount of control and thus the amount of
price discrimination involved. Consider, in that connection, the
movie cassette market mentioned above, or the instance of second-
hand books discussed by Professor Fisher.7
Congress has decided that at least some monopoly power is a
good thing for movies and novels. 8 Nevertheless, it may be a good
thing that the First Sale Doctrine denies movie companies and book
publishers a legal right over resales and rentals. Under that Doctrine,
the owner of copyright in a movie or novel who wishes to sell
embodiments must compete with second-hand, library, and rental
copies of the same embodiment.
Competition from these other sources reduces the price the
copyright owner can charge, and gives consumers a number of
alternate choices at alternate prices. This is good for consumers-
provided that the other rights that the law does give to the copyright
owner (such as the right to control reproduction) provide sufficient
incentives for the desired amount of creation.
In Professor Demsetz's classic piece on price discrimination,
perfect price discrimination appeared desirable because its infinite
divisibility generated the seller at least as much revenue as did a
monopoly-and Demsetz was working from a framework that
76. I should mention that in the intellectual property field, the word "monopoly" is
typically used loosely, to indicate that a seller whose work is desired by the public is given some
control over price. Only rarely will that amount to a complete monopoly. Thus, some readers
will read only Stephen King's books when they're in the mood for quality horror fiction, but
other readers will view a number of other writers' books as potential substitutes.
77. See Fisher, supra note 12, at 1237.
78. Unlike uncreative compilations of data that are unprotected by copyright, movies and
novels are protected against a range of commercially significant uses by purchasers.
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assumed that full monopoly revenue was required to provide
adequate incentives. 9 However, if in a particular context a lesser
amount of revenue is acceptable from the incentive perspective, then
it is better to give IPR owners rights with lacunae than to give them
all-embracing rights, no matter how finely the owners are able to
price discriminate. Other things being equal, consumers are better off
if price differences result not from one supplier's efforts to
discriminate, but rather from the presence of additional suppliers.
This means that Professor Fisher's charts need to be redrawn.
Under the First Sale Doctrine, there are many sources for books and
cassettes, and many prices. Therefore, a single-seller, single-price
model is not the appropriate starting point for comparison. 8° Instead,
once the copyright owner of movies and novels has begun to sell
cassettes and books, the copyright owner becomes only one of many
decentralized sources for those movies and cassettes.
The result, again, may be lower price and greater quantity.
Therefore, so long as incentives are not an issue-and that is an
empirical matter not to be settled by abstract graphs-it is lesser price
discrimination rather than more that may increase consumer welfare.
There is much to learn from Professor Fisher's excellent article,
as there is from Judge Easterbrook's wide-ranging scholarship and
jurisprudence. But each makes an argument about price discrimina-
tion that is flawed. In ProCD, the argument depends on unproven
and even unstated assumptions; in the Fisher piece, the argument
depends on an inappropriate comparison.
CONCLUSION
The Patent Act gives the inventor or her assigns the exclusive
right to "make, use, and sell" the invention. This means (among
other things) that if someone wants to mass-produce the invention,
she needs a license from the inventor. This will cost more than
purchasing a single embodiment of the invention. Similarly, the
Copyright Act provides separate exclusive rights over reproduction,
sale, adaptation, public performance, and public display. This means
that copyright owners can distinguish in the prices they charge so that
persons who buy a copy to read it pay one price, while those who
want to reproduce, adapt, or publicly perform or display it need to
79. See Demsetz, supra note 3.
80. See Fisher, supra note 12, Figure 1 at 1235.
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spend more.
Price discrimination classically was a way for monopolists to
profit by distinguishing among different buyers' differing willingness
to pay.81 Yet a monopolist charging a single price imposes a higher
deadweight loss on society than one who does not. That is because a
monopolist who price discriminates makes more money, but also
provides more products to more people, than a monopolist who does
not.
So yes, it is true that once one has a monopoly in an intellectual
product, it can be a good thing for society if that monopolist can price
discriminate.8 2 That is what Professor Demsetz taught,83 and that is
precisely what our statutes do. 4  Incentives are necessary, so
Congress grants exclusive rights that can lead to monopolies, and the
rights are subdivided in a way that makes price discrimination easy.
But the choices of where to allow price discrimination are deliberate.
Thus, the copyright statute fosters price discrimination between
readers and replicators, but does not foster price discrimination
between those who buy a copy for reading pleasure and those who
buy a copy to mine it for ideas on which to base their own next
production.85 One cannot leap to the assumption that where some
monopoly is a good idea, more price discrimination is better.
Moreover, and most fundamentally, price discrimination is at best a
mode of ameliorating a monopoly's effects. It is not a reason to
approve a firm's efforts to use contracts to acquire monopoly power
over a market.
81. This willingness, in turn, is often dependent on intensity of use. The Copyright and
Patent Acts single out particular intense uses, and give the IPR holder the power to charge
differentially among them.
82. But note that even if the allocative welfare effects of perfectly price discriminating
among the buyers of an intangible were good, such price discrimination also produces a
potentially noxious distributive effect: the elimination of consumer surplus. Under monopoly,
with or without price discrimination, producers are richer, and consumers poorer, than they
would be in a purely competitive world.
83. See Demsetz, supra note 3, and the discussion of Demsetz in supra note 3. For other
limitations on Professor Demsetz's analysis, see Michael Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Dis-
crimination (working paper 1999).
84. It is not clear that Professor Demsetz saw that the intellectual property statutes already
facilitated price discrimination.
85. Under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1997) and settled caselaw, copyright cannot be claimed in an
idea.
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